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Sterling: Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars:Essays in

government on Afghanistan—specifically, the discussion on various debates
among the CIA, the State Department,
and the National Security Council—
which were wide-ranging and often
contentious. After reading these accounts one is left with the distinct
impression that there was no overarching policy or strategy to attack
al-Qa‘ida. Instead, U.S. government
policy comes across as ad hoc, driven
by current contingencies or spurious
information about Osama Bin Laden’s
whereabouts.
In the final section, Coll documents the
often frantic and uncoordinated interagency campaign to find Bin Laden.
Despite George Tenet’s declaration in
December 1998 that the CIA was at war
with al-Qa‘ida, the U.S. government as
a whole never fully came to grips with
the threat posed by terrorism. For many
in Washington, terrorism represented
only one threat among many facing the
United States in the post–Cold War era.
Although terrorism did elicit concern
among top U.S. policy makers, it rarely
moved into a sustained, interagency
strategy to combat the threat.
Prospective readers of this book should
be aware that it is lengthy and requires
close attention. Characters and events
discussed in part 1 are revisited. Coll
helps the reader along with a list of
principal characters at the front of the
book. Despite its length, however,
Ghost Wars will provide valuable insights for anyone working within the
interagency process, as well as scholars
and regional observers interested in
how the United States got Afghanistan
and Bin Laden so tragically wrong.
AMER LATIF

Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia
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Maurer, John H., ed. Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor
of Michael I. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
164pp. $79.95

One of three volumes of essays (two focus on different aspects of strategy) published in Handel’s memory, this work is
based on a conference held in Newport,
Rhode Island. It offers four scholarly papers on Churchill’s assessment of the
German naval challenge before the First
World War, Pacific security and the limits of British power between the wars,
Churchill and the German threat in the
late 1930s, and Churchill’s views of technology. Each assesses a different aspect
of Churchill’s changing role.
Editor Maurer focuses on the early
1900s’ battleship naval race with Germany. Brought in as First Lord of the
Admiralty after the Agadir crisis of
1911, Winston Churchill is seen here as
fully aware of the danger to Britain if its
fleet were to be seriously disabled. The
Admiralty tried to maintain at least a 60
percent advantage in dreadnought construction against Germany. Churchill
sought to impress the Germans with the
futility of trying to catch up with, let
alone outbuild, Britain. Cognizant of
the costs of this race, however, in 1913
he proposed a naval “holiday” to
stretch out the construction of projected new ships over more time, hoping to reduce the pace. Maurer reviews
the important domestic political battles
that underlay this naval arms race.
Christopher Bell, who teaches history at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, assesses Churchill’s concern
over the growing threat posed by Japan
in the interwar years. He notes a 1928
Churchill comment that “of all the wars
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in the world, [war with Japan] was the
least likely to happen.” After all, the two
countries shared an alliance that dated
to the beginning of the century. Extension of the “ten-year rule,” first promulgated in 1919, saw war in the Far
East as highly unlikely for at least another decade. As Bell makes clear, this
rule underlay a compromise between
the Treasury, concerned about costs,
and the Admiralty, which sought completion of its Singapore naval base and
more ships. By the mid-1930s, an outof-office Churchill began to change his
position, now expressing (as were
Whitehall ministries) growing concern
about Japan’s intentions. However, his
greater worry about a rearming Germany dominated naval needs in the Far
East. Even in 1939 he argued the unlikelihood of a Japanese attack on faroff Singapore, just as he (and others)
felt naval power alone could hold off
aggression. Events, of course, proved
this to be wishful thinking.
B. J. C. McKercher, the sole revisionist
here, teaches history at the Royal Military
College of Canada. He sees Churchill’s
famous speeches against Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s as revealing a
politician on the make: “Quite simply,
he sought the premiership above all
else; thus, his criticisms of British foreign and defense policy were less selfless
than either he or his disciples later
claimed.” McKercher’s arguments help
balance excessive praise (years later) of
Churchill’s stance in this period. He
strongly defends prime ministers Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain as
working to rebuild British defenses just
as Churchill was attacking their seeming inaction. Munich is seen here—as
by other revisionists—as a vital play for
time to allow rearmament to reach full
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effect. Churchill’s years in the political
wilderness “resulted from his own follies, primarily his antipathy to Baldwin
and Chamberlain,” during which, he
argues, “Churchill consistently exaggerated threats.”
David Jablonsky teaches at the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and
makes clear Churchill’s fascination with
what technology offered to overcome potential enemies. There are a host of interesting Churchill quotes on the impact
(sometimes literally) of newly developed
dum-dum bullets, improved pistols, and
later the tank and the airplane. At the same
time, Churchill was often concerned
about possible unintended effects of technological choice, as well as the ethics of
applying certain approaches. As the author notes, “The basic problem, Churchill
came to realize, was that technology had
changed the scale of warfare.” Before and
during the war, he was fascinated with
technical options, not all of them workable. Those that did work—such as signals intelligence—made a huge difference
in the outcome.
This is a very useful collection, carefully
researched and written, adding insight
to what we know of Churchill’s varied
diplomatic and military roles in a world
that moved from cavalry charges to hydrogen bombs. Michael Handel would
surely be pleased.
CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

George Washington University

Mullis, Tony R. Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army
Operations in Bleeding Kansas. Columbia: Univ.
of Missouri, 2004. 273pp. $40.50

Tony Mullis, a serving officer in the
U.S. Air Force, takes a close look at a
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